Zagzebski, Linda. On Epistemology
2009, Wadsworth.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsPublisher's Note: What is knowledge? Why do we want it? Is knowledge possible? How do we get it? What about other epistemic values like understanding and certainty? Why are so many epistemologists worried about luck? In ON EPISTEMOLOGY Linda Zagzebski situates epistemological questions within the broader framework of what we care about and why we care about it. Questions of value shape all of the above questions and explain some significant philosophical trends: the obsession with answering the skeptic, the flight from realism, and the debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism. THE WADSWORTH PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS SERIES (under the general editorship of Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University) presents readers with concise, timely, and insightful introductions to a variety of traditional and contemporary philosophical subjects. With this series, students of philosophy will be able to discover the richness of philosophical inquiry across a wide array of concepts, including hallmark philosophical themes and themes typically underrepresented in mainstream philosophy publishing. Written by a distinguished list of scholars who have garnered particular recognition for their excellence in teaching, this series presents the vast sweep of today's philosophical exploration in highly accessible and affordable volumes. These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy.
Zagzebski, Linda. The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good
2003, Metaphilosophy 34(1-2): 12-28.
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Added by: Jie Gao, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsAbstract: Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.
Comment: This paper nicely elucidates different respects of the value problem about knowledge and enriches the debate by bringing multiple resources and perspectives into consideration, such as the agency of the knower and the wider value of good life. It is good for teachings on epistemic values in an epistemology course at either an advanced or introductory level.
Zagzebski, Linda. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About
2004, Philosophical Papers 33(3): 353-377.
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Added by: Rie Iizuka, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsAbstract: In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which it is not wrong to hold unconscientiously. I also argue that epistemic values enjoy a privileged place in the panorama of what we care about because they are entailed by anything we care about. That means that when there is a conflict between caring about knowledge or true belief and caring about something else, that conflict cannot be resolved simply by following the one we care about the most because caring about knowledge in any domain is entailed by caring about that domain. Finally, I argue that whereas caring demands different degrees of conscientiousness in different contexts, contextualism about knowledge is less plausible.
Comment: An interesting paper on the concept of care in virtue epistemology. This paper might be useful in the course of virtue epistemology or philosophy of care.
Zagzebski, Linda. Omnisubjectivity
2008, Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Vol. 1.
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Added by: Emily PaulSummary: Zagzebski argues that traditional omniscience ought to be revised into 'omnisubjectivity', whereby God has 'perfect total empathy' with all conscious beings. She elaborates on what is meant by this, and makes the important qualification that when God has perfect total empathy, God is aware that God's empathetic state is a 'copy'. Zagzebski is motivated by conceiving of God as a personal being, who knows everything about God's creatures - including their conscious states. An analogy is drawn to Jackson's Mary the Colour Scientist - Mary's does not know 'what it is like' to see in colour when confined to her black and white room, in spite of knowing all propositional facts about colour science and seeing in colour. Similarly, with classical omniscience, God knows the truth value of every proposition, but does not know 'what it is like' to be each of God's creatures. Omnisubjectivity alleges to thus build on classical omniscience, whilst avoiding the worry that God (mistakenly) thinks that God actually is each conscious creature.
Comment: Very useful for teaching about classical vs non-classical conceptions of God (omnisubjectivity being a 'non-classical' version of omniscience).
Zagzebski, Linda. What is Knowledge?
1999, in John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell)): 92-116.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsSummary: This chapter is an analysis of propositional knowledge, including how we are to define it, focusing on 'justified true belief' and Gettier objections. It concludes with a definition of knowledge as 'an act of intellectual virtue', drawing on virtue ethics. Zagzebski then defends this definition.
Comment: Very useful as an introduction to an introductory course on Epistemology. Sets the scene really well by introducing the concept of knowledge, and different kinds of knowledge and Gettier cases. For this reason, it would make a great first reading on an introductory epistemology module.
Zagzebski, Linda. Morality and Religion
2005, in William J. Wainwright (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Emily PaulChapter Introduction: Almost all religions contain a code of morality, and in spite of the factthat there are moral codes and philosophies that do not rely upon anyreligion, it has been traditionally argued that there are at least threeimportant ways in which morality needs religion: the goal of the morallife is unreachable without religious practice, religion is necessary toprovide moral motivation, and religion provides morality with itsfoundation and justification. These three ways in which morality may need religion are independent, but I argue that there are conceptual connectionsamong the standard arguments for them. I identify reasons for resistance tothe idea that morality needs religion and then turn to arguments for each ofthe three ways in which morality may need religion. All three are related toclassic forms of the moral argument for the existence of God. I conclude bycomparing classic Divine Command Theory with my Divine Motivation Theory andargue that the latter has advantages over the former in the way it providesa theological foundation for ethics.
Comment: Useful to teach this after soliciting intuitions about whether religion is a suitable basis for morality - and the general relationship between religion and morality. Could perhaps follow a unit on Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma. Could lead to a nice seminar debate around the question of something like 'Is Religion a Suitable Basis for Morality'? It seems students are more inclined to answer 'no', but perhaps this article can do more to motivate debate from the 'yes' group of the debate.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Recovering Understanding
2001, In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsAbstract: Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding involves representing the world nonpropositionally, e.g. through visualization or diagrams. Taking this to be the defining characteristic, proposes that understanding is a state of comprehending nonpropositional structures of reality, such as automobiles, pieces of music or art, the character of a person, or a causal nexus. Argues that virtue epistemology is better suited than traditional epistemology to help us develop a successful analysis of understanding thus conceived. For unlike the theories from which it departs, virtue epistemology takes the objects of valuable epistemic states to consist of both propositional and nonpropositional objects.
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Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy
2007, Episteme 4 (3):252-263.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsAbstract: In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic.
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Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsPublisher's Note: In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains
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Zahle, Julie. The individualism-holism debate on intertheoretic reduction and the argument from multiple realization.
2003, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33.1: 77-99.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia RichAbstract: The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the reductive project may run into other potential obstacles. For this reason, it is concluded that the prospect of intertheoretic reduction is uncertain rather than unlikely.
Comment: This reading discusses one of the most important arguments in the methodological individualism / holism debate in the philosophy of social science. It is recommended for a philosophy of social science class.
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Comment: Zagzebski offers a very approachable overview of main issues in Epistemology. Particularly useful in undergraduate teaching are: Chapter 1 which provides a general introduction focusing on the relationship between knowing and caring; Chapter 2 which introduces scepticism and presents some contemporary responses to it; and Chapter 5 which introduces Gettier problems. The remaining chapters expand on those topics and offer an overview of virtue epistemology.